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Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights 
MARK A. EDWARDS 
Compliance with—or deviance from—law is often dependent upon the 
law’s convergence with—or divergence from—normative sensibilities.  
Where the legality and social acceptability of behavior diverge, some 
deviance is socially acceptable.  Property rights evolve in response to 
changes in normative sensibilities.  Constructing a model of acceptable 
deviance and applying it to property rights, we can predict and actually 
observe the evolution of property rights in response to changes in 
normative sensibilities in areas as diverse as file-sharing, foreclosures, the 
use of public space, and fishing rights.  We can also predict and observe 
stresses in legal institutions created by divergences in the legality and 
social acceptability of behavior with regard to property rights.  Law 
functions as an anchor on behavior, providing stability, but also space for 
deviance which permits the evolution of property rights.   
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Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights 
MARK A. EDWARDS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Where the legality and social acceptability of behavior converge, legal 
institutions function well.  Where they diverge, it is ultimately the law, 
rather than the behavior, that changes.  Why that is true tells us a great deal 
about the function of law and its relationship to the normative sensibilities 
of those who create it, enforce it, and live in its shadow.   
This Article examines divergences between social acceptability and 
legality of behavior with regard to property rights and considers what those 
divergences tell us about the nature of law and property rights generally.  
Based upon the insight that behavior often occurs within limits of 
normatively acceptable deviance around law, rather than within the terms 
of the law itself, Part II constructs an “acceptable deviance” model of the 
relationship between the legality and social acceptability of behavior, 
focusing on instances in which legality and social acceptability diverge and 
either deviance becomes socially acceptable, or compliance becomes 
socially unacceptable.  Part III explores and compares utilitarian and 
normative models of compliance and deviance with utilitarian and 
normative models of the evolution of property rights.  Part IV then applies 
the acceptable deviance model to the evolution of property rights.  The 
model allows us to predict and actually observe the evolution of property 
rights in response to changes in normative sensibilities in areas as diverse 
as natural resources, copyright, foreclosures, and the use of public space.  
We can also predict and actually observe stresses in legal institutions 
created by divergences in the legality and social acceptability of behavior.  
The Article concludes that law functions as an anchor on behavior, 
providing stability but also space for deviance, which permits the evolution 
of property rights.  
II.  A MODEL OF ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE 
Law and behavior have a tenuous and sometimes tense relationship.  
They are influenced by each other’s gravitational pull.  They do not merge, 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  My sincere thanks for their 
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property/. 
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but they cannot break free of each other.  Sometimes law is enforced, 
sometimes it isn’t; sometimes law is complied with, sometimes not.1  Often 
regulators and the regulated seem to reach an implicit agreement about 
which laws will be enforced and complied with, and under what 
circumstances.2  That agreement seems to be the product of innumerable 
day-to-day encounters between the state and its citizens.3  I have referred to 
the limits of socially acceptable deviance around law as “parameters of 
acceptable deviance” or PADs.4  Within these parameters are behaviors 
that are illegal but socially acceptable; their boundaries are the point at 
which law is actually enforced.  Those boundaries become, in a sense, the 
informal but real law.   
The simple model below provides a convenient illustration of the 
convergence and divergence of behavior’s legality and its social 
acceptability.  It helps to predict the movement of behaviors across 
boundaries of legality and social acceptability and to demonstrate the 
reaction of legal institutions to divergences between them. 
Legal Illegal
Normatively Unacceptable
Normatively Acceptable
Legality and Acceptability Model
                                                                                                                          
1 Grattet and Jenness have observed that statutes “cast a shadow” over law enforcement, but do 
not control it.  Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency 
Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
893, 935 (2005).  As Tom Tyler explains, behavior diverges from law in many areas, “from tax evasion 
to drunk driving and drug abuse,” despite enforcement efforts.  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
THE LAW 19 (1990) (“[P]olice officers and judges have been unable to stop” many types of illegal 
behavior); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 60–61 (1963) (noting that even within contractual relationships, norms rather than 
contracts are the primary governor of behavior). 
2 See Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 57 fig.1 (2006) (depicting “the effect of the relationship between legality and 
normative acceptability on enforcement”). 
3 See id. 
4 See id.  
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The model works this way: in the upper left quadrant are behaviors that are 
both legal and socially acceptable.  In the lower right quadrant are 
behaviors that are both illegal and socially unacceptable.  Legal institutions 
generally work well in protecting behaviors in the upper left quadrant, 
while sanctioning behaviors are in the lower right quadrant.   
Conversely, legal institutions often falter in reaction to behaviors in the 
opposite quadrants.  In the upper right quadrant are behaviors that are 
illegal, but socially acceptable; interestingly, these tend not to trigger an 
enforcement response from legal institutions.  In the lower left quadrant are 
behaviors that are legal, but socially unacceptable.  No formal enforcement 
response is possible, since the behavior is not illegal.  In the absence of a 
formal enforcement response, these behaviors may—and often do—trigger 
an informal enforcement response from the community in the form of 
social sanctions. 
The model can be applied across several legal and behavioral 
boundaries.  Consider, for example, the relationship between driving 
behavior and speed limits in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone. 
Legal Illegal
Normatively Unacceptable
Normatively Acceptable
Traffic Law and Driving
65 m.p.h. 65–79 m.p.h.
> 79 m.p.h.< 65 m.p.h.
 
As the model above suggests, it is generally both legal to drive sixty-
five m.p.h. and socially acceptable (although just barely).  On the other 
hand, it is both illegal and generally socially unacceptable to drive at 
speeds much over eighty m.p.h.  Doing so might trigger both informal 
social sanctions—such as harsh looks from other drivers or muttered 
curses—and a formal enforcement response from the state, in the form of a 
speeding citation. 
More interesting, however, are the instances in which the legality and 
social acceptability of behavior diverge.  It is here that deviance may occur 
within parameters of acceptability.  Again, consider speeding: it is formally 
 
462 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:457 
deviant but socially acceptable to drive between sixty-five to seventy-nine 
m.p.h.  Interestingly, that behavior, though illegal, is very unlikely to 
trigger a formal enforcement response.  On the other hand, driving much 
under sixty-five m.p.h., though legal, is socially deviant and is very likely 
to trigger an informal enforcement response through social sanctions in the 
form of tailgating, flashing headlights, or obscene gestures.  In other 
words, behavior that is formally deviant but socially acceptable does not 
generate an enforcement response from the state; behavior that is formally 
compliant but socially unacceptable generates an enforcement response 
from society. 
Take a moment to consider how extraordinary this common-place 
behavior really is.  The state goes to the highly unusual effort of informing 
its citizenry about the content of the law.  Yet each person knows, without 
being told, that the law as written does not, ultimately, set the boundaries 
of behavior.  The social acceptability of behavior sets its boundaries.  Even 
more extraordinary, the state implicitly acknowledges that system, and 
actually sanctions behavior that is outside the boundaries of social 
acceptability, rather than merely outside the law.  It is all so common-place 
that most of us have lived with it our entire lives and never even noticed. 
In addition to demonstrating the convergence and divergence between 
the legality or social acceptability of behavior, the model can be used to 
test predictions about the evolution of law in reaction to changes in 
normative sensibilities.  Behaviors should tend to rotate in a counter-
clockwise direction through the model.  As behaviors move toward social 
acceptability they usually move toward legality.  When behaviors become 
socially unacceptable, they may soon become illegal.  As Roscoe Pound 
observed more than a century ago, “[i]n all cases of divergence between 
the standard of the common law and the standard of the public, it goes 
without saying that the latter will prevail in the end.”5 
Until legality and social acceptability converge, there can be serious 
and predictable malfunctions triggered in legal institutions.  Because 
behaviors that are legal but socially unacceptable, or illegal but socially 
acceptable, tend to stress legal institutions, they can each create pathways 
for abuse.  These two dangers—which might be called “popular justice” 
and “selective enforcement”—are represented in the model below.  
                                                                                                                          
5 Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615 (1907). 
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Legal Illegal
Normatively Unacceptable
Normatively Acceptable
Malfunctions Triggered by Divergence of Legality and Acceptability
Selective
Enforcement
Popular Justice
 
Recall that behaviors which are legal but socially unacceptable do not 
generate a formal enforcement response, but instead generate informal 
social sanctions.  That sanctions are informal “does not mean that they are 
less effective than direct enforcement by the courts and/or by the police.”6  
These sanctions may be as mild as hard stares or as extreme as vigilantism.  
An example from our nation’s recent past might be a mixed-race 
relationship.  The danger here is obvious: in the absence of a formal 
enforcement response, the ugliest form of “popular justice”—vigilantism—
is always a threat.   
Conversely, behaviors that are illegal but socially acceptable generally 
do not generate a formal enforcement response because legal institutions 
generally sanction behaviors that are outside of PADs, rather than outside 
the law.  An ill-motivated enforcement officer, however, can selectively 
enforce the law against some people because of factors other than their 
behavior, and immunize themselves against charges of unlawful 
motivation because of the behavior’s formal illegality.  
Consider again the example of speeding.  Driving seventy-five m.p.h. 
in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone is socially acceptable and is therefore unlikely 
to generate a formal enforcement response.  But assume the driver is 
African American and the police officer is a bigot.  Because the speeding is 
formally illegal, an unlawfully-motivated police officer could stop a 
minority driver and, according to the Supreme Court, immunize himself 
from the charge of unlawful motivation through the formal illegality of the 
                                                                                                                          
6 UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTRODUCTION 6 (2000). 
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behavior.7 
The next Part examines existing models of deviance and compliance 
and compares them with models of the evolution of property rights.  After 
that, I apply the PADs model of acceptable deviance to the evolution of 
four very different property rights and interests.  
III.  MODELS OF COMPLIANCE, DEVIANCE, AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A.  Compliance and Deviance 
Scholars have identified three models of decision-making that may be 
applied to the decision whether to comply with a law or regulation: (1) 
cognitive, in which actors make decisions based upon “taken-for-granted 
roles and scripts” without conscious considerations of alternatives; (2) 
instrumental or rational choice, in which actors make decisions primarily 
based on their material self interest; and (3) normative or moral, in which 
actors make decisions based on ingrained beliefs about the acceptability of 
behavior.8      
Cognitive models emphasize taken-for-granted cultural rules that make 
decision-making seem unnecessary.9  Mark Suchman offers the example of 
a man’s decision about what to wear to a professional conference; chances 
are, he does not consciously decide—regardless of whether it is a matter of 
rational choice or normative sensibility—to forego wearing a skirt.  
Instead, he unconsciously follows cultural rules that render such conscious 
decision-making unnecessary.10 
Rational choice models, of course, suggest that actors will choose to 
comply when the cost of deviance exceeds its benefits.  The cost of 
deviance can be calculated by discounting the penalty that will be assessed 
for non-compliance by the likelihood of its assessment, and then 
                                                                                                                          
7 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  In Whren, the Supreme Court held that 
the actual motivation of police in stopping two African American men for a minor traffic violation was 
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 812 (“Not only have we never held, outside the 
context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates 
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted 
the contrary.”).  The minor traffic violation was a pretext used by the police to search the two men for 
drugs because the officers lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the men 
possessed drugs.  Id. at 808–09.  The defendants were not permitted to introduce evidence that 
allegedly showed that the police rarely stopped vehicles for such minor violations.  Id. at 815.  The 
Court held that as long as the police were justified in initiating the stop because of illegal driving 
behavior, it would not consider the true motivations of the officers.  See id. at 813 (stating that the 
Court has been “unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations 
of individual officers”).  In other words, the formal illegality of the driving behavior immunized the 
police from charges of unlawful motivation, despite the driving behavior’s social acceptability.    
8 Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the 
Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 475–76. 
9 Id. at 476.   
10 Id. at 475. 
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subtracting from that amount the benefit of non-compliance.11  In order to 
deter prohibited behavior, regulators must work the calculation backwards.  
First, regulators must assign a value to the benefits of non-compliance; 
then assess a penalty, discounted by the probability that it will be assessed, 
that outweighs the benefit.12   
The problem with this model is that, in reality, it generally does not 
work well.13  It is based on two unlikely assumptions about the regulated: 
first, that they can instantaneously and accurately perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of compliance (in other words, that they can calculate the 
deterrence value of a regulation); and second, that they will then rationally 
choose whether to comply or not, based upon that calculation.  It also 
depends on two unlikely assumptions about regulators: first, that they can 
accurately calculate the benefits of non-compliance; and second, that they 
can assess penalties, correctly discounted by the likelihood of enforcement 
that will deter the unwanted behavior.14  There is scant empirical evidence 
that these assumptions are correct; in fact, much empirical evidence 
suggests just the opposite.15  Moreover, for regulators, the system operates 
against itself.  Deterrence value depends enormously on the likelihood of 
enforcement, but the relative benefit to society of compliance compared to 
the cost of harmful behavior is lessened by every dollar devoted to 
enforcement. 
Yet people are—or at least appear to be—generally law-abiding.16  If 
deterrence does not produce compliance, then what does?  It turns out that 
compliance is not a product primarily of the threat of penalty for non-
compliance; it is primarily a product of the regulated’s agreement that the 
prohibited behavior is unacceptable.  “Simple deterrence will often fail to 
produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address . . .  
                                                                                                                          
11 For example, if the penalty is $100,000, and the likelihood of its assessment is ten percent, then 
the deterrence value of the regulation is $10,000.  In theory, if the benefit of non-compliance is less 
than $10,000, then the regulated will comply.   
12 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
176–77 (1968) (explaining calculations used to deter prohibited behavior).  
13 See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? 
Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2000) (noting that “[i]t is a 
potential offender’s perception of whether he or she can manipulate the system, not the reality, that 
matters”).  
14 This collection of unlikely assumptions is sometimes referred to as “the deterrence trap.”  See 
John C. Coffee, Jr.,“No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389–92 (1981) (explaining the application of the 
deterrence trap); Christine Parker, The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive 
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 591–603 (2006) (describing the application of 
deterrence and compliance traps as regulatory enforcers). 
15 See Robinson, supra note 13, at 1843 (“Punishment will not deter one who cannot make the 
logical connection between criminal conduct and punishment or one who cannot resist the impulse to 
commit the criminal conduct no matter how clear the resulting liability or how unpleasant the 
consequences.”). 
16 See TYLER, supra note 1, at 3 (“Americans are typically law-abiding people.”). 
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perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior.”17  Tom Tyler has shown 
that “[t]he most important normative influence on compliance with the law 
is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her 
sense of right and wrong.”18  When it does, he concludes, people become 
self-regulating, and “[s]elf-regulating people are law-abiding [people].”19  
In other words, compliance is the result of law’s convergence with 
normative beliefs.    
Recognizing the limits of the instrumental model of compliance, some 
rational choice theorists have acknowledged the importance of norms in 
compliance decisions, but have tried to place them within a rational choice 
framework.20  This effort generally takes one of two forms.  Some rational 
choice theorists have argued that the decision whether to obey or defy a 
norm is just another cost-benefit decision.21  An actor might weigh, for 
example, whether the cost to his reputation of disobeying a norm is less 
than the one-time economic benefit of doing so.  If the benefit exceeds the 
cost, the actor would be expected to disobey the norm.  For example, 
Robert Cooter regards both law and norms as means of imposing costs on 
unwanted behavior.  In his view, “[t]he state can impose law from the top 
down by enacting novel obligations, as illustrated by most regulatory law; 
or, alternatively, law can grow from the bottom up by enforcing social 
norms.”22  Interestingly, Cooter suggests the appropriate role for the state 
with regard to norms is to use law to “correct failures in social norms.”23  
“Social norms are ‘perfect’ when law cannot improve upon them relative 
to . . . standards of efficiency.”24  In other words, norms fail when they fail 
to produce behavior that maximizes economic efficiency.  In such cases, 
law must be used as an instrument to produce a better result, but used 
sparingly because “[s]uccessful state enforcement typically requires a close 
alignment of law with morality, so state officials enjoy informal support 
from private persons.”25 
                                                                                                                          
17 Parker, supra note 14, at 592. 
18 TYLER, supra note 1, at 64. 
19 TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiii (2002). 
20 See Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 157, 164–65 (2000) (“[A] social order based on laws can be maintained without massive coercion 
only if most people, most of the time, abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social tenets 
embedded in the law.  It can be maintained only if the majority of the transactions engaged in are 
sufficiently undergirded by social norms, and thus do not require constant intervention by public 
authorities.  Above all, laws work best and are needed least when social norms are intrinsically 
followed.”). 
21 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 972 
(1997) (“[T]he social norm must have a punishment-induced equilibrium with an efficient level of 
deterrence.”). 
22 Id. at 947. 
23 Id. at 949. 
24 Id. at 972. 
25 Id. at 979. 
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Other rational choice theorists have attempted to fit norms within the 
rational choice model by suggesting that even if an individual’s discrete 
decision to obey a norm is not the product of cost-benefit analysis, norms 
are the product of an unconscious collective cost-benefit decision, whereby 
a society evolves norms that embody economic efficiency.26  Norms are, in 
this view, an extrinsic or environmental force that are either entered into 
the rational choice calculus, or produced by it.27  For example, Robert 
Ellickson, in his well-known study of the relationship between legal rules 
and norms with respect to the maintenance of boundaries between cattle 
ranchers, regards both law and norms as types of rules that produce 
efficient results, where a “rule” is defined as a “guideline for human 
conduct” that “actually influences the behavior either of those to whom it 
is addressed or of those who detect others breaching the guideline.”28  
According to Ellickson, norms are rules that emanate from “social forces” 
and laws are rules that emanate from governments.29  Law is enforced by 
the state; norms are enforced through sanctions imposed by private 
parties.30  While norms and law differ in the source of their creation and in 
the identity of their enforcers, they are nonetheless the product of rational 
choice decision-making. 
But norms are not encompassed within rational choice theory quite so 
easily.  As Amitai Etzioni points out, regarding norms solely as an 
extrinsic force misses their intrinsic and possibly non-rational nature.31  
Non-rational sources of norms might include “tradition, institutions, 
customs, and habit.”32  Norms, therefore, may be in part the fruit of 
extrinsic rational choice, but are also in part created and enforced without 
regard to rational choice.33  In this way, norm-based decision-making often 
arrives at the same result as cognitive decision-making, but through a 
different process.  In other words, like the rational choice model, normative 
                                                                                                                          
26 See id. at 953 (explaining that efficiency in common law rules might be explained by judicial 
enforcement of social norms, which “evolve towards efficiency”); Etzioni, supra note 20, at 176 
(“Behavior that is endorsed by social norms and also rewarding in narrow economic terms is likely to 
be the most stable.  Conversely, behavior that is censured by social norms and economically 
unrewarding is most likely to be abandoned.”). 
27 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 128, 
167 (1991) (“[W]hen social conditions are close-knit, informal norms will encourage people in non-
zero-sum situations to make choices that will conjoin to produce the maximum aggregate objective 
payoff.”); Etzioni, supra note 20, at 172 (citing Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997)) (describing the conditions that produce a 
norm).  
28 ELLICKSON, supra note 27, at 128. 
29 Id. at 127. 
30 Id. at 127–28.   
31 Etzioni, supra note 20, at 173. 
32 Id.   
33 See id. at 175 (stating that “social norms themselves are in part the fruits of rational choice” and 
once this is accepted, “one can then explore the ways in which the factors modeled by law and 
economics and law and society may be effectively combined into a socioeconomic perspective”). 
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and moral models presuppose conscious choices by decision-makers, but 
the influence of normative beliefs is intrinsic, not extrinsic.  Based on those 
beliefs, “people rarely act in ways that they, themselves, genuinely believe 
to be morally wrong.”34  Normative models suggest that “when morality 
and law concur, people behave in ways that comply with the law,”35 when 
they diverge, deviance results.36   
This intrinsic process has an extrinsic effect: law evolves to embody 
norms.  “Law often grows from social norms that create order from 
consensus obligations.”37  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz describes how, “[a]s a 
consensus develops within a group or community that a certain type of 
behavior is undesirable, the consensus begins to form a baseline level of 
expectation.”38  Thus the real meaning of law—that is to say, how it is 
lived—is determined not only by regulators, but by the regulated, “across 
the traditionally understood boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of 
the legal system.”39 
The intrinsic power of norms has important implications for 
compliance with—and enforcement of—law.  Intrinsic willingness to obey 
the law is strongest “when the law faithfully reflects broadly shared 
values.”40  On the other hand, “social order based on laws can be 
maintained without massive coercion only if most people, most of the time, 
abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social tenets embedded 
in the law.”41  In short, “laws work best and are needed least when social 
norms are intrinsically followed.”42  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
scholars have found that regulatory enforcement works best when 
accompanied by “extraregulatory factors” including a “sense of 
                                                                                                                          
34 Suchman, supra note 8, at 480. 
35 Id. at 487.  
36 Normative sensibilities that could lead to formal deviance may be overcome by an intervening 
belief in the legitimacy of the legal system itself, and the consequent belief that one should obey the 
law even if one normatively or morally disagrees with its requirements.  Moreover, by regarding the 
legal system as legitimate, one may be persuaded that the law itself is moral, and adjust one’s 
normative sensibilities to match the law.  Id. at 488. 
37 Cooter, supra note 21, at 978. 
38 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1280 (2000). 
39 Grattet & Jenness, supra note 1, at 935; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of 
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 406, 409 (1999) 
(explaining that, with regard to employment law, regulatory practices, as well as those regulated by 
those practices, are what give law its meaning).  Law is not given meaning only in regulatory practices.  
It is also given meaning by the regulated.  As Edelman has observed with regard to employment law, 
the real meaning of law is created in part within the “realm that it seeks to regulate.”  Lauren B. 
Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil Rights, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 337, 339 (Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).   
40 Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1147 
(2007). 
41 Etzioni, supra note 20, at 165. 
42 Id.  If compliance with law and norms depends, as rational choice theorists suggest, upon a 
cost-benefit decision-making process, then externally imposed deterrence costs will be enormous, 
dependent upon a credible threat of enforcement.   
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commitment” and “the influence of peer and other group pressures.”43   
Recognizing, at least implicitly, that compliance often reflects the 
complier’s agreement that a regulation accurately defines acceptable 
behavior, regulators have begun more openly to attempt to prevent 
unwanted behavior by modifying perceptions of behavior’s acceptability, 
rather than by attempting to deter that behavior by threat of penalty.44   
“[L]aws supported by social norms are likely to be significantly more 
enforceable.”45  “Responsive regulation,” as it has been labeled, attempts 
“to build moral commitment to compliance” first and then attempts to deter 
non-compliance through the threat of penalty assessment only if regulators 
are unable to build that commitment.46   
Responsive regulation envisions enforcement techniques arranged in a 
pyramid with persuasive techniques forming the base of the pyramid and 
more coercive techniques toward the top.47  “The objective is that firms 
and individuals will comply, even without enforcement action, through 
internalization and institutionalization of compliance norms, informal 
pressure and the indirect threat of the ‘benign big gun’ at the top of the 
pyramid.”48  “In order for responsive regulation to even be possible, 
regulators must have the capacity to convince people that regulatory 
offenses represent shared values.”49  But, as Christine Parker has found, 
regulators cannot simply unilaterally create newly drawn boundaries of 
socially acceptable behavior.  Unless the regulated agree with “the moral 
seriousness of the law,” they regard attempts at its enforcement as unfair, 
which has “a negative influence on long-term compliance.”50  The decision 
to comply or not with any law or regulation is shaped in part by whether 
the regulated party considers herself a party to that implicit “social 
contract,” that itself is the product of “repeated, reciprocal interactions” 
between regulators and the regulated, which act as a type of negotiation 
over shared expectations.51   
                                                                                                                          
43 Chris Koski & Peter J. May, Interests and Implementation: Fostering Voluntary Regulatory 
Actions, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 329, 330 (2006). 
44 See Parker, supra note 14, at 592 (suggesting that regulators should use mixes of regulatory 
styles to improve compliance, including addressing perceptions of the morality of the regulated 
behavior, rather than relying on deterrence alone). 
45 Etzioni, supra note 20, at 159. 
46 Parker, supra note 14, at 592. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 614. 
50 Id. at 591–92. 
51 Id. at 614; see also Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Perspectives of Farmers, 
Homebuilders, and Marine Facilities, 27 LAW & POL’Y 317, 337 (2005) (defining the social contract as 
“a set of shared norms about acceptable behaviors on the part of regulated entities and regulators”). 
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B.  The Evolution of Property Rights 
The debate over how property rights evolve mirrors with remarkable 
consistency debates over motivations for compliance with, or deviance 
from, law.  Just as scholars have constructed cognitive, instrumental, and 
normative models of decision-making, they have posited public choice, 
economic, and normative models of the evolution of property rights.  By 
applying theories of compliance and deviance to theories of property rights 
evolution, both are illuminated. 
James Krier states that the concept of property and property rights 
must have preceded the existence of the state; therefore, state action cannot 
explain every instance of the development of property rights.52  There are 
two possibilities that explain the emergence of property rights.  First, 
property rights might be “the product of intentional undertakings: property 
is ‘designed.’”53  Conversely, however, property rights regimes might 
result from the “unintended consequence of individual actions: property 
arises ‘spontaneously.’”54  In other words, property rights can be produced 
“formally by a government or informally by the cooperation of 
individuals.”55  The self-organization of property rights regimes may be 
analogous to the spontaneous emergence of complex systems that has 
generated a great deal of recent attention in the biological and physical 
sciences: “The most provocative claim of the prophets of complexity is 
that complex systems often exhibit spontaneous properties of self-
organization.”56  “Institutions, including property rights, emerge and 
develop in response to evolving economic and political conditions . . . .”57 
“The state has a passive role [in a process of establishing property rights] 
and supplies rules in response to pressures [from the grassroots  
level] . . . .”58  As Ugo Mattei puts it, “property law does not need the 
existence of the state.”59   
Once established, property rights are often described as providing 
stability that allows economically efficient transactions.60  But property 
rights are not static.  Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal note that, “there 
                                                                                                                          
52 James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
139, 143–44 (2009). 
53 Id. at 145.   
54 Id.  
55 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S360 (2002). 
56 Paul Krugman, Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 415 
(1994).  Studying phenomena as diverse as the spatial and social division of city neighborhoods and the 
routes ants take in gathering food, researchers have discovered that “starting from disordered initial 
conditions they tend to move toward highly ordered behavior.”  Id.   
57 Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, Spontaneous (Non)emergence of Property Rights, 12 
ECON. OF TRANSITION 103, 104 (2004). 
58 THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 261 (Mark Perlman & E. 
Roy Weintraub eds., 1990). 
59 MATTEI, supra note 6, at 4, 5. 
60 Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1098. 
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can be no doubt that, once a robust system of private property has been 
established, the precise content of that standard bundle of property rights 
shifts over time in response to varying pressures and incentives, both 
internal and external to the institution of ownership.”61  But exactly why 
and how property rights evolve is a matter of considerable debate.  
Scholars have posited public choice, economic, and normative models of 
changes in property rights.   
Public choice theorists argue that the evolution of property rights is 
dependent primarily upon political power.  Simply put, “societies 
reallocate property rights when some exogenous political realignment 
enables a powerful group to grab a larger share of the pie.”62  As a result, 
public choice theorists tend to be skeptical of economic theories that 
suggest property rights evolve toward optimal economic efficiency.  Saul 
Levmore, for example, has noted that because “optimal rules may be 
impossible to ascertain” any claim that property rights evolve toward 
optimal efficiency is necessarily suspect.63 
Unlike the public choice model, economic and normative models do 
not presuppose that property rights emerge from deliberate acts of political 
power.  According to Harold Demsetz, property rights move from common 
usage to private property when some external factor makes common usage 
less economically efficient than private property—in other words, when 
the benefits of adopting private property rights outweigh the costs of doing 
so.64  Demsetz predicted that private property rights would replace open 
access commons when the benefits of internalizing, through the allocation 
of private property rights, the externalities resulting from common use of a 
resource outweigh the costs of creating and defending private property 
rights.65  This might occur when increased demand for a resource increases 
the cost of externalities associated with common usage, relative to the cost 
of allocating private property rights.  Alternatively, it might occur when 
developments in technology reduce the cost of allocating private rights 
relative to the cost of externalities associated with common usage.66  
Drawing upon accounts of the fur trade among Native Americans during 
and after increased demand for furs following contact with Europeans, 
Demsetz predicted that property rights would move from common usage to 
private property when increases in the complexity and magnitude of 
                                                                                                                          
61 Id. at 1100. 
62 Banner, supra note 55, at S360. 
63 Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 185 
(2003). 
64 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967).   
65 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access 
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 77, 78 (2009) (discussing Demsetz’s theory that private property 
would replace open-access property regimes when the “benefits [of] internalizing externalities 
exceeded the costs of formalizing and defending private property rights”). 
66 Demsetz, supra note 64, at 350. 
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economic relationships resulted in increased scarcity of valuable 
resources.67  
In the aftermath of Demsetz’s seminal work, scholars have critiqued 
and refined his cost-benefit model.  Barry Field has noted that the 
transition between open access commons and private property rights is not 
a one-way journey following the evolution of societies from primitive to 
complex, but rather a two-way street; that is, private property rights 
sometimes transition to open access commons.68  Other scholars have 
noted that even with Fields’s additional insight, the Demsetz cost-benefit 
model does not seem to capture the dynamic changes in property rights 
observable in the real world.69  Stuart Banner, for example, has stated that 
“[p]roperty rights cannot simply be assumed, like other goods, to be 
produced in a pattern that responds to the changing costs and benefits of 
producing them.”70  Regardless of whether the right is produced formally 
or informally, its production “is necessarily a collective endeavor.”71  
Therefore, transitions in property rights regimes, according to Banner, will 
inevitably face collective action problems.72  Banner is persuaded, like 
Demsetz, that transitions in property regimes do seem to move toward 
efficiency.73  His objection is that Demsetz fails to describe a means by 
which the transition occurs, and in particular fails to identify a means of 
overcoming two obstacles: collective action and transaction costs.74  As 
Banner states, “[a]n initial allocation of property rights gives rise to a 
certain amount of path dependence.”75  That path dependence is, in 
Banner’s characterization, a type of transaction cost: it makes reallocation 
of rights more difficult, whatever the economic efficiencies.76  To 
overcome those obstacles, the expected payoffs to the winners under the 
new regime must be sufficient to overcome the cost.  Such was the case, 
according to Banner, when English colonists reallocated property rights in 
                                                                                                                          
67 See id. at 352 (proposing that the rise of the fur trade increased the value of furs to the Indians 
and increased the scale of hunting activity, thus increasing the importance of externalities associated 
with free hunting and changing the property right system in such a way as to “take account of the 
economic effects made important by the fur trade”).  
68 See Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319, 320 (1989) (arguing that 
factors such as population growth and increases in demand do not invariably cause society to move 
away from common toward individual property institutions but in fact sometimes “encourage greater 
use of common property”). 
69 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 84 (stating that “Demsetz’s one-way 
evolutionary account is not fully supported by history”). 
70 Banner, supra note 55, at S360. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at S361. 
74 See id. (stating that Demsetz’s theory is missing an “account of how a society can overcome the 
obstacles that might block a transition to a more efficient property regime” as well as an “account of 
the mechanism by which efficiency gets translated into political action”).  
75 Id. at S364. 
76 Id. 
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Maori lands to their own benefit.77   
Bell and Parchomovsky, responding to Demsetz and his critics, have 
refined the economic model of property rights evolution by positing a three 
dimensional cost-benefit model of property rights evolution, along axes of 
the number of owners, asset configuration, and extent of the owner’s 
dominion.78  They note that the number of owners can run on a continuum 
from open access to a single owner and everything in between.79  
Similarly, the extent of dominion over property can expand or contract in 
reaction to changing circumstances or sensibilities.80  In response to 
changing economic incentives, the configuration of assets can and does 
change frequently.  For example, tracts of real property are divided or 
combined81 and, in a contemporary example, music may be sold on a per-
track basis rather than in whole albums. 
But perhaps the primary driver in the evolution of property rights is 
neither political nor economic.  As Carol Rose stated, “property begins in a 
social context.”82  Peñalver and Katyal agree:   
Ownership of land and the structures attached to land provide 
the spaces and places in which we carry out our social 
existence . . . . Accordingly, property rights and the social 
norms that accompany (and are often reinforced by) property 
ownership play an important role in ordering our interactions 
with other human beings.83   
In this way, property rights are “broadly reflective of evolving community 
values.”84  Rose noted that the destruction of the property rights claims of 
people who exist outside of social groups is “a matter of relative 
indifference” to those within.85  Demsetz himself recognized that changes 
in property rights regimes might result not from economic incentives but 
from “changes in social mores.”86 
Joseph Singer argues that normative sensibilities must play a crucial 
                                                                                                                          
77 Id. at S363. 
78 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 86. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he dominion of property owners may be restricted either by narrowing the 
rights and privileges owners enjoy with respect to their property or by limiting the list of duty bearers 
who must respect the rights of property owners.”). 
81 Id. at 87. 
82 Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 6 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Property and Language].  
83 Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1132. 
84 Id. at 1101. 
85 Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 29 [hereinafter Rose, Property and Expropriation].  For the seminal case 
demonstrating Rose’s point, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 570 (1823), holding that 
under authority of the crown, absolute title to land vested in civilized persons discovering barbarous 
countries, and that Indians maintained only a right to occupancy. 
86 Demsetz, supra note 64, at 350. 
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role in the recognition of property rights.87  He notes that most people hold 
two, somewhat contradictory, conceptions of property rights.88  The first is 
what he calls the “castle conception,” which views restrictions on free use 
of private property as presumptively illegitimate.89  The second is the 
“environmental conception,” which views property rights not just as 
private rights but also as a set of social obligations that legitimately restrict 
the use of property.90  Deciding between them requires “normative 
reflection” through which we weigh “the legitimacy of claims and the 
significance of harms.”91  Accordingly, we rely upon property norms to 
“shape our understanding of the meaning of property rights and the 
legitimate contours of social relationships.”92  Norms do that by defining 
“who is an ‘owner’ and who is a ‘non-owner’” with regard to property, and 
then identifying social obligations, if any, that inhere in that ownership 
interest.93 
Normative property rights systems seem to arise with reference to, but 
separate from, formal legal systems without planning, through the 
cumulative effect of individual acts.  In many ways, they are self-
organizing systems—“systems that, even when they start from an almost 
homogeneous or almost random state, spontaneously form large-scale 
patterns.”94  Those “local, short-range interactions can create large-scale 
structure.”95  Normative property systems “may be considered ‘natural’ 
products of a spontaneous order whose idea is usually conveyed by the 
term ‘customary law.’ .  .  .  Many customary rules are at play, both very 
old or very new.  Often these rules are in competition with official rules 
recognized by the modern state.”96 
 Singer offers an example from the law of nuisance to demonstrate the 
primacy of normative sensibilities over instrumental considerations in 
defining property rights.  Rational choice theorists might tell us that all 
nuisance is reciprocal97: if noise from my factory interferes with your use 
and enjoyment of your residence, then your insistence on quiet at your 
residence interferes with my use and enjoyment of my factory.  But “[t]ry 
as the economists might to argue that the imposition of pollution on 
                                                                                                                          
87 See Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership 3 
(Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished research paper, No. 08–06, Harvard Law School), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093341 (discussing the good neighbor conception of property). 
88 Id. at 2–3. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 3. 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 Id. at 6.  
93 Id. at 7. 
94 PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 3 (1996). 
95 Id. at 17. 
96 MATTEI, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
97 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960) (describing the 
social cost problem as a “problem of a reciprocal nature”). 
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homeowners is morally and legally equivalent to the homeowners’ desire 
to limit the factory’s polluting activity, there is something in us that wants 
to rebel and not to see the actions as equivalent.”98  That thing in us, 
according to Singer, is the cultural power of both “conscious and 
unconscious norms.”99  Norms lead us to regard the factory’s pollution, 
rather than the homeowner’s limit on the pollution, as an externality that 
the law should make internal to its creator.100   
IV.  ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Here I apply the socially acceptable deviance model to compliance 
with, and deviance from, particular property rights and interests.  Three 
preliminary issues should be addressed.  The first is whether there is 
anything that makes property rights and interests a particularly fertile 
ground for this analysis.  After all, while it is true that property rights 
depend upon compliance and enforcement,101 the same can be said of other 
types of rights.  There are a number of reasons why property rights offer a 
particularly useful subject of analysis.  First, while the gap between formal 
law and law-as-lived has been studied in insightful depth by sociologists 
and political scientists with regard to criminal law102 and the regulation of 
businesses,103 less attention has been paid to the gap between property 
rights and behavior regarding property.104 
Second, property is a uniquely social institution.  After all, “what 
makes something ‘property’ is precisely that others routinely recognize and 
respect one’s claims,”105 with or without state enforcement of those claims.  
                                                                                                                          
98 Singer, supra note 87, at 10–11. 
99 Id. at 11.  
100 Id.  
101 See Banner, supra note 55, at S363 (“The organizers of a property system can deny the 
system’s benefits to certain people simply by refusing to enforce those people’s claims.”). 
102 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975) (discussing the selective 
enforcement of laws by the police); Robinson, supra note 15, at 1841 (examining the divide between 
the traditional aims of criminal law, and modern deference to lay institutions of justice). 
103 See, e.g., Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Perspectives of Farmers, Homebuilders, and 
Marine Facilities, 27 LAW & POL’Y 317, 317 (2005) (“In recent years regulatory scholars have turned 
attention from studying the enforcement actions of regulatory agencies to consideration of the 
motivations of regulated entities for complying with regulations.”).  It is not surprising that scholars 
have devoted particular attention to compliance with business regulation, given the vast regulatory 
apparatus that operates with regard to commercial activity in most advanced economies.  As Coglianese 
and Kagan have stated, “regulatory agencies and the rules they promulgate have become prominent 
components of contemporary legal systems, often eclipsing legislative and judicial rules in their 
economic and social effects.”  Introduction to REGULATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES xi, xi (Cary 
Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2007).  Regulators oversee, to a greater or lesser extent, 
“workplace safety, financial security, air and water pollution, fire and accident prevention, earthquake 
protection, health and elder care delivery, food and drug quality, and proper maintenance of airplanes, 
elevators, school buses and railroad tracks.”  Id. 
104 But see ELLICKSON, supra note 27, at 123 (providing a careful study of normative and legal 
constraints on behaviors regarding property in a rural community).   
105 Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 85, at 3. 
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The state often protects property rights through the enforcement of 
criminal sanctions, including sanctions for trespass, robbery, and fraud.106  
But formal enforcement of all property rights—like formal enforcement of 
the speed limit—is far beyond the capacity of the state.  Instead, property 
rights depend upon some level of compliance: “One person’s property can 
only exist, by and large, because other people accept it.”107  And 
compliance, as we have seen, is largely dependent upon whether law 
converges with normative sensibilities.  We have also seen, where law and 
normative sensibilities diverge, it is often the limits of normatively 
acceptable deviance from law, rather than the law itself, that defines the 
limits of rights.  In other words, it is the social acceptability of property 
rights claims, rather than their legality, that ultimately determines whether 
such rights are respected and, therefore, exist.  The phenomenon of 
acceptable deviance is observable with regard to property rights—as are 
the attendant dangers caused by the stresses acceptable deviance places 
upon legal institutions: selective enforcement and popular justice. 
Third, given the evolutionary and normative nature of property rights, 
their enforcement provides fertile ground for the study of the gap between 
the legality and social acceptability of behavior.  If, as the theorists 
reviewed in the previous section have argued, property rights evolve over 
time, then gaps are likely to emerge between legality and social 
acceptability.  The PADs model is a very useful tool for examining such 
gaps. 
If it is correct that property rights are particularly suited to this 
analysis, then a second preliminary issue is whether there is anything 
compelling about these four types of property rights and interests—
copyright, housing, the use of public space, and fishing rights—that merits 
close examination.  Each of these rights and interests exists within a 
rapidly shifting, contested terrain, where norms of socially acceptable 
behavior may evolve earlier than, or in opposition to, the content of the 
formal law.  These potential gaps between legality and social acceptability 
are, of course, the focus of the acceptable deviance model. 
The last preliminary issue that merits discussion is whether the simple 
PADs model applied to these property rights and interests is too simple.  It 
could, for example, be made more subtle and complex by examining 
instances in which changes in law drive changes in norms, rather than the 
reverse.  In addition, it does not address contested norms of social 
acceptability between groups with different socio-economic statuses.  
                                                                                                                          
106 See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1098 (“Laws of criminal trespass protect the 
boundaries around real property established through market transactions.  Laws prohibiting larceny, 
fraud, robbery, and burglary similarly wrap privately determined entitlements within the safety of the 
publicly enforced criminal law.”). 
107 Rose, Property and Language, supra note 82, at 3. 
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Those are phenomena that merit serious analysis, but they exceed the scope 
of this Article. 
A.  Copyright 
“[P]roperty rights in ideas are up for grabs where no such rights 
seemed possible before.”108  The right to exclude others is traditionally 
considered the most fundamental of all private property rights.  But 
advances in digital technology have rendered what once was protectable 
through private property rights very difficult, and perhaps unwise,109 to 
protect.  Moreover, technological advances have created changes in 
normative sensibilities regarding property rights.  Nowhere is that clearer 
than in the law of copyright.  The development of digital technology that 
created ease in sharing files also helped to create new norms governing 
file-sharing.  Bell and Parchomovsky note that the “[e]ase in digitizing 
information and expressions, and the shortcomings of encryption 
technology” have lead to widespread unauthorized duplication of 
copyrighted materials.110  Barry Field would predict that the increase in the 
cost of exclusion, and the resulting ineffective enforcement against 
trespassers, would push expressive content away from private property 
rights and toward open access.111  In fact, Bell and Parchomovsky 
conclude, “this dynamic is present in the area of copyright law.”112  In that 
unstable environment, non-commercial copying of music and film through 
digital technology may have moved from the illegal/socially unacceptable 
box to the illegal/socially acceptable box of the PADs model.  As a result, 
new informal property rights regimes have arisen, but not without 
enormous controversy.  The resulting confrontation has stressed legal 
institutions.  Legal institutions come under increasing pressure to align 
their response to the society’s normative sensibility.  Two recent cases that 
have attracted considerable publicity offer prominent examples of 
copyright owners pushing back against the increasing social acceptability 
of copyright violations. 
                                                                                                                          
108 Levmore, supra note 63, at 194. 
109 Bell and Parchomovsky note that holders of copyright have, in some ways, protected the 
existence of their private property rights by narrowing the scope of their dominion.  For example, many 
holders of copyright have made their works available to users through a Creative Commons license 
agreement under which royalty-free uses are available to anyone in return for acknowledgement of the 
copyright.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 94–95 (describing how “copyright holders 
voluntarily reconfigured their primary asset”). 
110 Id. at 92. 
111 See Field, supra note 68, at 328. 
112 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 92. 
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In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,113 the defendant, Jammie Thomas, 
was sued for copyright infringement by Capitol Records because she had 
downloaded twenty-four songs to which Capitol Records owned the 
copyright without permission from Capitol, and then placed them on the 
peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, from which others could also 
download them without permission from Capitol.114   
A jury found that Thomas had willfully infringed Capitol’s copyright 
by reproducing and distributing the recordings.115  The jury instruction 
under which Thomas was convicted stated that making copyrighted 
recordings available for downloading on a peer-to-peer network constituted 
distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution had occurred.116 
Shortly afterwards, the court vacated the verdict because it concluded 
that distribution of copyrighted materials required some affirmative act 
beyond simply making the materials available for download by others.117  
It granted Thomas a new trial with jury instructions amended to reflect that 
understanding.118   
Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the conduct of which 
Capitol complained was technically illegal but obviously commonplace 
and socially acceptable.  As the court explained, “Thomas acted like 
countless other Internet users.  Her alleged acts were illegal, but 
                                                                                                                          
113 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
114 Id. at 1212–13. 
115 Id.   
116 Id. at 1213. 
117 Id. at 1226–27. 
118 Id. at 1227. 
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common.”119  It was not simply the commonness of her conduct that left 
the court uncomfortable; it was the law’s evident failure to recognize that 
her conduct was not blameworthy enough to merit a substantial damages 
award.120  In other words, the court found that her conduct was not just 
common, it was common because it was socially acceptable.  The court 
expressly stated that it was being placed in a position that was awkward at 
best, and called upon Congress to change the law to better reflect the 
reality of social acceptability.121  In fact, the court “implore[d] Congress to 
amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to-peer 
network cases” such as Thomas.122  
The court clearly felt it was risking the obvious in stating that “it 
would be a farce to say that a single mother’s acts of using [KaZaA] are 
the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global financial firms illegally 
infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities market.”123  The 
court noted that “Thomas not only gained no profits from her alleged 
illegal activities, she sought no profits.”124  Instead she sought a most 
pedestrian and socially acceptable benefit: “free music.”125  On re-trial, the 
jury was not kind to Thomas: it awarded $1.9 million in damages.126  The 
intensely negative public reaction to the damages award strongly suggests 
that much of the public does not consider Thomas’s conduct particularly 
blameworthy.127  In fact, upon review, Judge Davis slashed the damages 
awarded to $54,000, writing that it was unjust to award more when 
Thomas’s only goal was “obtaining free music.”128  
Similarly, the case of confessed file-sharer Joel Tenenbaum has gained 
significant publicity recently.  The Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) filed suit against Tenenbaum in August 2007, alleging 
that he had illegally downloaded thirty songs.129  Tenenbaum eventually 
                                                                                                                          
119 Id. at 1227–28. 
120 Id.   
121 Id. at 1227.   
122 Id.   
123 Id.    
124 Id. 
125 Id.    
126 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 2010); see also 
Special Verdict Form at 17–20, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (No. 006-CV-01497) (awarding $80,000 for each copyright work infringed upon, totaling 
$1.9 million). 
127 See, e.g., Nate Anderson, What’s Next for Jammie Thomas?, ARS TECHNICA (June 21, 2009, 
8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/whats-next-for-jammie-thomas-rasset.ars 
(reporting that “the outrage isn’t confined to the blogosphere”); J.R. Raphael, Has the RIAA’s Fight 
Against File-Sharing Gone Too Far?, PCWORLD (June 19, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
167058/has_the_riaas_fight_against_file_sharing_gone_too_far.html (reporting that in response to the 
verdict against Thomas, “the blogosphere, as well as Twitter users, are buzzing with outrage”).    
128 Memorandum of Law & Order at 2, Capital Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 
1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (Civ. No. 06-1497), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/minnesota/mndce/0:2006cv01497/82850/366/. 
129 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219 (D. Mass. 2009). 
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admitted that he used the peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA to 
download and share the copyrighted songs.130  
United States District Court Judge Nancy Gertner expressed similar 
misgivings as Judge Davis did in the Thomas case, expressly recognizing 
that a shift in digital technology had created a shift in norms that made 
formally illegal behavior common: “The advent of widespread internet 
access in the late 1990s threw a number of norms into disarray, offering 
sudden access to a wealth of digitized media and giving the veneer of 
privacy or anonymity to acts that had public consequences.”131  She was 
clearly unhappy with the prospect of imposing civil liability on people who 
had acceded to the new norms, rather than obey the formal law, stating, 
“there is a huge imbalance in these cases,”  “[a]t a certain point after 133 
cases in my court and countless others around the country, the plaintiffs are 
going to realize this is making no sense and making them look bad,”  “[the 
case] should be over in a rational world . . . ,” and “I can’t say this is a 
good situation or a fair situation, it is, however, the situation.”132 
RIAA’s counsel, Eve Barton, defended its actions by declaring its 
frustration that, essentially, society was ignoring the law in favor of norms 
that permitted file-sharing133—in other words, that people were choosing to 
behave within parameters of acceptable deviance rather than within the 
law.  As Judge Gertner noted, the Tenenbaum case was just one of many.  
In 2003, RIAA launched a litigation campaign that has targeted 35,000 
file-sharers.134  Interestingly, in the Tenenbaum case the voir dire process 
was described by Judge Gertner as “one very long, very tortured day,” in 
part because RIAA’s attorneys challenged each of the potential jurors who 
admitted to file-sharing themselves.135      
In pre-trial proceedings, Judge Gertner ruled that Tenenbaum could not 
argue “fair use” as a defense.136  As a consequence, with Tenenbaum 
                                                                                                                          
130 See id. (stating that Tenenbaum argued “his file sharing constituted a ‘fair use’ under the 
Copyright Act”).   
131 Id. at 237.   
132 Transcript of Motion Hr’g at 8–9, 25–26, Capitol Records, Inc., v. Noor Alaujan, 2009 WL 
5873132 (2009) (No. 03-11661).   
133 Id. at 26–28.  
134 Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-people-turns-lawsuits-3-strikes.  
135 Ben Sheffner, Tenenbaum Trial Begins with “Tortured” Jury Selection, ARS TECHNICA (July 
27, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/tenenbaum-trial-opens-following-last-
minute-dismissal-of-fair-use-defense.ars.  The challenges were successful, which may help explain why 
the jury was unsympathetic to Tenenbaum. 
136 Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 220; see also Nate Anderson, Judge Rejects Fair Use  
Defense as Tenenbaum P2P Trial Begins, ARS TECHNICA (July 27, 2009, 12:05 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/judge-rejects-fair-use-defense-as-tenenbaum-p2p-
trial-begins.ars (stating that Judge Gertner “granted the record labels’ request for summary judgment on 
the issue of fair use”).  The doctrine of fair use, as described in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), provides that it 
is not an infringement of copyright to copy an original work for purposes such as criticism, teaching, 
scholarship, and research.  Factors to be considered in determining whether a particular use is fair 
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having admitted that he downloaded the files, Judge Gertner had little 
choice but to enter judgment against him.137  The only issue left for the jury 
to decide was damages.138 
Tenenbaum recognized that his only hope was that the jury would 
agree that his behavior was socially acceptable, even if formally illegal, 
and essentially nullify the directed verdict entered against him by assigning 
only nominal damages.  His counsel openly appealed to the jury for 
nullification, prompting a sustained objection from RIAA and anger from 
Judge Gertner.139  The phenomenon of jury nullification is, in many ways, 
an embodiment of the PADs model.  It is an appeal to a jury, as in the 
Tenenbaum case, to privilege socially acceptable deviance above socially 
unacceptable enforcement of formal law.140  Jury nullification has, at times, 
been regarded as a courageous embrace of norms over law: for example, 
the acquittals of violators of the Fugitive Slave Act and Prohibition.141  In 
this case, the jury did not nullify the directed verdict.142  Instead, it awarded 
damages of $675,000, out of a possible $4.5 million in damages permitted 
by the statute.143  Judge Gertner, like Judge Davis, then slashed the award 
by ninety percent, reducing it to $67,500.144    
The popularity of file-sharing, and the courts’ evident discomfort in 
sanctioning it, suggests that this use of copyrighted music has moved from 
illegal and socially unacceptable to illegal but socially acceptable.  As 
predicted by the evolutionary model of property rights, a change in social 
                                                                                                                          
include whether the use is commercial or not-for-profit, the effect of the use on the market value of the 
original work, whether the copying is limited or encompasses the original work as a whole, and 
whether it is in the public interest that access to the original work be unrestricted.  17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006).  In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim that 
copying music and sharing it on peer-to-peer networks was fair use of the copyrighted works, because 
the original works were copied in their entirety and the use had a negative effect on the market value of 
the original work and on the market for creative work generally.  239 F.3d 1004, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
137 Ben Sheffner, Fate of “Hardcore, Habitual” Infringer Tenenbaum up to Jury, ARS TECHNICA 
(July 31, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/fate-of-hardcore-habitual-
infringer-tenenbaum-up-to-jury.ars. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the 
National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2003) 
(describing past cases where jury nullification was used and “heralded as [a] courageous example[] of 
political protest and moral integrity”). 
141 Id. 
142 Ben Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum! RIAA Wins $675,000, or $22,500 Per Song, ARS TECHNICA 
(July 31, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-wins-
675000-or-22500-per-song.ars. 
143 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–13 (2009).  Hannaford-Agor and Hans distinguish between 
nullification that results from disagreement about the content of law, and nullification that results from 
perceived unfairness about the punishment associated with its violation.  Hannaford-Agor & Hans, 
supra note 140, at 1277.  The relatively small amount of damages awarded, when compared to the 
potentially liability, may suggest that the jury was more concerned about the fairness of punishment 
than the fairness of the law itself.  Id. 
144 See Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Slashes Downloading Penalty, BOS. GLOBE, July 10, 2010, at 1. 
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acceptability of file-sharing behavior has placed pressure on the boundaries 
of legality.  Only time will tell whether that behavior will migrate across 
the boundary of legality, so that file-sharing becomes both socially 
acceptable and legal.  There is one indication that holders of copyright may 
indeed be reluctantly bending to this pressure.  Recently, RIAA announced 
its decision to end its five-year campaign of lawsuits against file-sharers.145  
The campaign did not ultimately reduce file-sharing.146  In fact, file-sharing 
sites such as Limewire and BitTorrent have increased in hits, and have 
become some of the most visited sites on the Internet.147  Peer-to-peer 
networks now comprise forty-five percent of all internet traffic.148  
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, by conservative 
estimates, one in five American Internet users “is an active file-sharer.”149  
If the regulated, by refusing to comply with the law, and the regulators, by 
declining to enforce the law, implicitly agree that this form of deviance is 
socially acceptable, that deviance becomes the de facto law for most of us.  
As long as the practice remains formally illegal, however, the danger 
inherent in the divergence between the legality and social acceptability of 
behavior—selective enforcement—is very real.  And that danger, predicted 
by the PADs models, is evident in the cases of Jammie Thomas and Joel 
Tenenbaum in the outrage that greeted the verdicts against them and the 
frustration of Judges Davis and Gertner.150  
In another example of property rights evolving to reflect changes in 
normative sensibilities prompted by developments in digital technology, 
“sampling” has become a recognized form of artistic expression.  In 
sampling, user-generated content piggybacks on copyrighted material, and 
creates a new and, according to Lawrence Lessig, essentially democratic 
form of expression not previously possible.151  Copyright owners have 
reacted by taking steps to protect their rights.  One prominent example of 
this effort is the removal of copyrighted works from user-generated content 
posted to YouTube (that is, self-made videos set to copyrighted music).152  
Due to pressure from copyright holders, YouTube developed a technology 
that permits copyright holders to discover use of their property on 
                                                                                                                          
145 von Lohmann, supra note 134.  
146 ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (2008), 
http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-later. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 von Lohmann, supra note 134.  
150 See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(stating that the court is “very, very concerned that there is a deep potential for injustice in the 
Copyright Act as it is currently written”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 
(D. Minn. 2008) (urging Congress to amend the Copyright Act).  
151 Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 968–70. 
152 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A GUIDE TO YOUTUBE REMOVALS: SO MY VIDEO WAS REMOVED 
FROM YOUTUBE . . . WHAT DO I NEED TO KNOW? (2009), http://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-
property/guide-to-youtube-removals. 
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YouTube.153  The technology identifies brief portions of songs used in 
user-posted videos, even if the song is never mentioned in the materials 
describing the video.154  If the technology discovers copyrighted material, 
it automatically removes it from the user-posted videos.155  Users have 
responded to this practice with fury and disgust.156  This outrage and 
derision at attempts to enforce the law is similar to the anger one might 
expect from a driver issued a speeding ticket for driving sixty-seven m.p.h. 
in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone.  
Lawrence Lessig insightfully traces historical parallels to the current 
controversy in the development of previous recording and distribution 
technologies.157  He notes that the 1888 invention by George Eastman of 
the Kodak camera made photography economically and technologically 
accessible to large numbers of people and set off a similar crisis regarding 
whether one could capture and copy the image of someone else without the 
permission of that person.158  Lessig posits that had courts not found that 
one could photograph and print without the subjects’ permission, the 
viability of photography as a means of expression among non-
professionals would have been in grave jeopardy.159  Whether music 
sampling finds similar protection remains to be seen. 
 B.  Use of Public Space 
Communities are often self-organized in the face of growth.160  This 
self-organization takes two primary forms: the creation of communities 
self-organized by the race and economic status of their inhabitants, and the 
informal delineation of appropriate and inappropriate behaviors in shared 
public spaces.161 
Another word for the first type of self-organization might be informal 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  As a personal example, in 2008, I posted on YouTube two videos of highlights of my 
eleven-year-old son’s baseball season so that his grandparents, who live several states away, could see 
them.  On the first, I included Jimi Hendrix’s version of the song Voodoo Child (Slight Return) as 
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found a notice from YouTube informing me that I had violated copyright with regard to the second 
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156 See, e.g., Matthew Humphries, Universal Sued by Angry Mother over YouTube Video 
Removal, GEEK.COM (July 23, 2008, 10:52 AM), http://www.geek.com/articles/law/universal-sued-by-
angry-mother-over-youtube-video-removal-20080723 (describing how “[a]n angry mom has decided to 
go to the courts after Universal has demanded a YouTube video of her son dancing be removed from 
the popular site”).  
157 See Lessig, supra note 151, at 961 (describing the history of camera technology). 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 961–62. 
160 See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 4 (1991) (stating that new urban 
centers “contain all the functions a city ever has”).  
161 See id. at 4, 282 (stating that the new urban communities are world of pioneers and 
immigrants, as well as “a set of customs, behaviors, or attitudes”). 
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segregation.  Los Angeles, for example, has self-organized into at least 
twenty-six different communities, most based on function and the race of 
their inhabitants.162  This segregation is a form of self-organization that 
today may emerge despite, rather than because of, zoning laws.  Self-
segregation occurs regardless of law because social sanctions are applied to 
unacceptably socially “deviant” behavior, regardless of its legality.163  That 
socially “deviant” behavior unfortunately may include, for example, a 
minority moving into a majority neighborhood.  The social sanctions 
applied to such “deviance” can include shunning164 and vandalism.165  On 
that basis, neighborhoods may tend to self-segregate.  
Similar self-organization emerges with regard to the use of public 
spaces.  Less attention has been directed to this phenomenon.  For 
example, the use of public sidewalks may be divided into uses along 
vectors of legality and social acceptability.  Window shopping is a use of 
public sidewalks that is both legal and socially acceptable.  Drug dealing, 
by contrast, is a use of public sidewalks that is both illegal and generally 
socially unacceptable.  Enforcement to prevent this behavior is both 
accepted and expected. 
More interesting are instances in which the legality and social 
acceptability of the use of public sidewalks diverge.  Religious 
proselytizing is a legal use of public sidewalks that usually cannot generate 
a formal enforcement response, since it is behavior protected by the First 
Amendment.166  However, because it may be generally socially 
unacceptable, it often evokes informal social sanctions in the absence of 
formal ones.  Proselytizers may find themselves the object of hard stares, 
and other sidewalk users may cross the street to avoid them or to confront 
them. 
For example, members of the Westboro Baptist Church have garnered 
infamy for proselytizing on sidewalks across from soldiers’ funerals.167  
They display signs at the mourners and passersby, with messages such as, 
                                                                                                                          
162 Id. at 283. 
163 See id. at 281 (“[F]orbidding walls around subdivisions make a kind of sense . . . . They are 
social boundaries.  They define ‘community’ and give it an entry point, financially and socially: only 
certain people can get in.”). 
164 See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & ROBERT F. MEIER, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 37 
(12th ed. 2004) (discussing a conservative Mennonite community’s practice of shunning women who 
deviate from the community’s strict dress code). 
165 For example, minority homeowners are sometimes targeted with racist graffiti.  See, e.g., 
Vandals Target Happy Valley Home with Racist Graffiti, Threaten To Burn Down Their House, THE 
OREGONIAN, (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/happy-valley/index.ssf/2010/09/ 
happy_valley_family_victims_of_racial_harassment.html.     
166 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 
165–66, 168 (2002) (holding an Ohio ordinance regulating door-to-door canvassing, as applied to 
religious proselytizing, to be in violation of the First Amendment). 
167 Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
2006, at A14. 
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“Thank God for I.E.D.’s,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “You’re 
Going to Hell.”168  The sect claims that God is punishing the United States 
for tolerating homosexuality.169  Because the behavior of the sect is legal, 
formal enforcement response is unlikely.  Indeed, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the First Amendment 
protects the group from a suit for emotional distress brought by the father 
of a soldier killed in Iraq, after the group picketed his son’s funeral.170  
However, because the behavior is socially unacceptable, informal social 
sanctions in the form of popular justice and vigilantism is predictable and, 
in fact, have occurred.171  A motorcycle club has launched a concerted 
campaign to drown the sect out at funerals.172  More ominously, there have 
been vigilante-style attacks on their demonstrations by outraged on-
lookers.173 
On the other hand, performing on public sidewalks—such as by 
musicians or magicians—is a behavior that is often formally illegal but 
generally socially acceptable.  Because this use is socially acceptable, a 
formal enforcement response might be unlikely—people enjoying a 
sidewalk performance would be unhappy to see the performer driven off 
by a police officer.  In other words, sidewalk performances are illegal but 
well within the parameters of acceptable deviance, and legal institutions 
bend to accommodate that normative sensibility.  The same might be true 
for simple aimless wandering. 
The danger here is the “selective enforcement” malfunction caused by 
behavior that is socially acceptable but formally illegal.  Consider, for 
example, the well-known Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville case.174  In 
Papachristou, the Supreme Court heard the cases of eight people arrested 
for “vagrancy” by Jacksonville, Florida police.175  All were convicted, and 
their separated cases were consolidated for appeal.176  Four of the 
defendants—Margaret Papachristou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Melton, and 
Leonard Johnson—were arrested together and convicted of “vagrancy—
‘prowling by auto.’”177  The four were on a double-date, driving on 
                                                                                                                          
168 Id. 
169 See Westboro Baptist Church, FAQ, GODHATESFAGS, http://www.godhatesfags.com/ 
faq.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). 
170 See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 210–11, 226 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1737 (2010). 
171 5 Arrested for Attacks on Anti-Gay Protesters at Military Funeral, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 
22, 2006, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196487,00.html. 
172 Ryan Lenz, Motorcycle Club Blocks Protesters, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at A09. 
173 See 5 Arrested for Attacks, supra note 171 (stating that when members of the Westboro Baptist 
Church protested at a military funeral, “a man broke through the police line and began assaulting two 
of the Westboro protesters”).  
174 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
175 Id. at 156. 
176 Id. at 156–57. 
177 Id. at 158. 
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Jacksonville’s main thoroughfare from a restaurant where they had eaten 
dinner.178  Eugene Melton and Leonard Johnson were African American; 
Margaret Papachristou and Betty Calloway were white.179 
The vagrancy ordinance which the four were convicted of violating 
prohibited “[r]ogues and vagabonds . . . persons who use juggling . . . 
common night walkers . . . [and] persons wandering or strolling around,” 
among many other things.180  Oddly, “prowling by auto,” the crime for 
which the defendants were convicted, was not on the list of prohibited 
activities, but Florida asserted that “prowling by auto” was encompassed 
within “wandering or strolling around.”181  The Supreme Court struck the 
ordinance down under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process doctrine of 
“void for vagueness.”182  The Court explained that the Jacksonville 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in two senses.183  First, it 
failed to give adequate notice of what it prohibited.184   Second, just as the 
PADs model suggests, the ordinance was ripe for selective enforcement, 
since it outlawed behavior that was common and socially acceptable—and 
which generally did not generate a formal enforcement response—despite 
its formal illegality.185 
Legal Illegal
Normatively Unacceptable
Normatively Acceptable
Use of Public Sidewalks
Shopping Performing for $
Drug Dealing
Proselytizing
(Day Labor 
Markets)
Day Labor 
Markets
---
(Day Labor 
Markets)
Funeral 
Demonstrations
---
(Funeral 
Demonstrations?)
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A contemporary embodiment of the Papachristou problem may 
involve the use of public space for informal markets for day laborers.186  
Each morning in public spaces throughout the United States, men and 
women gather hoping to be hired for short-term employment, primarily in 
construction and landscaping.187  Although the practice has existed for 
decades,188 anti-immigration sentiment has produced a backlash against 
it189 because unemployment is rising and in recent years the day labor 
market participants are disproportionately Latino immigrants.190  
Groups representing day laborers have challenged the enforcement of 
ordinances prohibiting day labor markets on public property on the same 
grounds raised in the Papachristou case, arguing that the ordinances are so 
vague that selective enforcement is inevitable, and they impinge on free 
speech rights.191  In response to concern about the presence of day laborers, 
the city of Redondo Beach, California enacted an ordinance prohibiting 
standing on sidewalks or other public ways in order to solicit employment 
or business of any kind.192  The court found that the ordinance was much 
broader than necessary to promote the city’s legitimate interests in traffic 
safety, crime prevention, and aesthetics.193  The court noted that, 
interpreted literally, the ordinance would prohibit not just day labor 
markets, but also people hailing cabs and children selling lemonade.194  
That breadth invited selective enforcement against the real targets of the 
ordinance: day laborers.195  Moreover, the city had not provided an 
adequate alternative space for the day laborers to gather, in that it had 
banned them from all public property in the city.196  
As is often the case, where behavior is legal but socially unacceptable, 
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the danger of “popular justice” is very real.  Recently in Riverside, 
California, local neo-Nazis massed at the site of an informal day labor 
market with the express goal of shutting it down.197  Violence erupted 
between the Nazis and members of a Latino activist group.198  In a second 
California community, anti-immigration groups sponsored a rally in 
support of the arrests of day laborers for soliciting work on public land, 
after immigrant rights groups sued to stop the arrests.199 
Other jurisdictions have enacted anti-day labor ordinances that have 
yet to be challenged in court.  The town of Oyster Bay, New York, for 
example, has resorted to increasingly stringent measures to prevent 
immigrants from using public space to secure day labor employment.200  It 
recently enacted an ordinance which prohibits “solicitation of 
employment” by, among other things, “waving arms, making hand 
signals,” or standing in public roads in the direction of oncoming traffic.201  
The town of Huntington Station, New York, recently went a step further: it 
ordered a private landowner who had allowed immigrant laborers to live in 
makeshift homes on his lot next to a hiring center to “clear it of garbage 
and debris.”202  The workers’ tents were leveled, although many of their 
possessions remained on the land.203  Town officials suggested that without 
a place to live, the day laborers might “seek employment in other 
locations.”204   
As the PADs model predicts, with regard to the use of public spaces, 
behavior like performing that is formally illegal may be socially 
acceptable, while behavior like day labor markets that are formally legal 
may be socially unacceptable.  Those divergences produce unique stresses 
in legal institutions.  Where day labor markets are recognized as legal, but 
are socially unacceptable because of the perceived immigration status of 
their participants, the danger of popular justice may manifest itself in 
violent acts such as those committed by the neo-Nazis in Riverside.  On the 
other hand, as the court in Comite de Jornaleros recognized, a broad 
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202 Karen Zraick, For Suffolk Day Laborers, Times Get Tougher as Makeshift Homes Are Leveled, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A32. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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prohibition on common uses of public space—encompassing a wide range 
of behaviors that includes day labor markets—creates the very real danger 
of selective enforcement motivated by the race or ethnicity of the 
participants rather than by any actual disruption caused by their 
behavior.205 
C.  Foreclosure and Eviction 
The mortgage crisis—and the epidemic of foreclosures it has 
spawned—has destabilized norms regarding the social acceptability of 
behavior with regard to real estate possession.  One of the most pernicious 
effects of the mortgage crisis has been the eviction of blameless tenants.  
Leases are usually terminated by foreclosure.206  Tenants who have never 
missed a rent payment, and who have no idea that their landlord has not 
been applying rent payments to their mortgage obligations, suddenly face 
eviction—often with no notice.207  The problem is so pervasive, and so 
normatively objectionable, that county sheriffs upon whom the burden of 
eviction falls have been refusing to carry out the evictions under some 
circumstances.208  For example, Thomas Dart, the sheriff of Cook County, 
Illinois, unilaterally imposed a moratorium on the eviction of renters in 
foreclosed properties, over the howling objections of the banks.209  
Similarly, the sheriffs of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Wayne County, 
Michigan, have refused to evict blameless tenants.210   
                                                                                                                          
205 That may be particularly true of day labor markets since, as at least one researcher has found, 
day laborers tend to establish and enforce order amongst themselves, rewarding responsible behavior 
with referrals to, and priority placement with, employers.  Carolyn Pinedo Turnovsky, Doing the 
Corner: A Study in Immigrant Day Laborers in Brooklyn, New York (Oct. 17, 2005) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).  
206 For a state-by-state summary of the relevant law, see NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., 
FORECLOSURE AND EVICTION PRACTICES BY STATE: DRAFT 7/25/2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.nlihc.org/doc/State-Foreclosure-Chart.pdf. 
207 Id. 
208 See US Sheriffs Don’t Want People Evicted as Foreclosure Rates Expected To Soar in New 
Year, PROPERTYWIRE (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.propertywire.com/news/north-america/us-sheriffs-
foreclosure-rates-200812122249.html (stating that county sheriffs are refusing to process property 
eviction orders). 
209 See Illinois Sheriff Scolds Banks for Evction of ‘Innocent’ Renters, CNN (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-10-08/us/chicago.evictions_1_eviction-notices-mortgage-payments-
mortgage-companies?_s=PM:US (quoting the Illinois Bankers Association as describing Dart’s refusal 
to carry out evictions as “vigilantism at the highest level” and a “declaration of ‘martial law’”).  
210 Amy Goodman, Facing Foreclosure? Don’t Leave. Squat., ALTERNET (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://www.alternet.org/rights/125533/.  
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Often institutions of enforcement do not enforce the law but instead 
enforce the limits of acceptable deviance around the law.  When they are 
called upon to enforce the law in a manner that conflicts with standards of 
social acceptability, it is often the institutions that give way rather than the 
standards.  Therefore, it is not surprising that some sheriffs are refusing to 
carry out evictions; they are bending to norms of acceptable deviance.  Nor 
is it surprising that Congress and many state jurisdictions are enacting laws 
to limit the power of banks to evict blameless tenants in foreclosed 
properties.211  The social acceptability of possession by blameless tenants 
following foreclosure is pressuring the law to evolve.  Norms drive law. 
In addition to the illegality but social acceptability of holdovers by 
blameless tenants, illegal squatting in foreclosed homes is becoming both 
more pervasive and, apparently, more socially acceptable.212  
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur recently urged people whose mortgages 
have been foreclosed to become squatters in their former homes.213  
According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, advocacy groups 
around the United States are taking possession of foreclosed properties for 
the homeless—often openly.214 
                                                                                                                          
211 See Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1632, 
1660–61 (2009) (permitting renters of foreclosed properties to remain in possession for ninety days, or 
until the property is sold to someone who will occupy it). 
212 See Goodman, supra note 210 (describing how Congresswoman Kaptur has advised 
homeowners facing foreclosure to stay in their property instead of leaving).  
213 Id. 
214 John Leland, With Advocates’ Help, More Squatters Call Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2009, at A1.  
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The advocacy groups report that they sometimes get support from 
neighbors, in part because occupied houses stay in better condition, and 
attract less crime than abandoned, foreclosed homes.215  Abandoned homes 
may become havens for drug use and targets for copper thieves, who rip 
out walls to get copper plumbing and wire.216  By contrast, Take Back the 
Land, a Florida-based advocacy group, screens squatters it helps to find 
abandoned homes, and requires them to earn “sweat equity” by cleaning 
and repairing the homes.217  “As far as the neighbors are concerned, the 
current tenants—squatters though they are—are a vast improvement over 
the crack den the vacant house had become.”218   
It is reminiscent of the squatters’ rights movement of the 1970s and 
1980s in cities in the northeastern United States. 219  The movement placed 
members of the growing homeless population in a large number of 
abandoned and condemned buildings.  Squatters, though acting illegally, 
brought order rather than disorder into swaths of cities that stood 
abandoned.  In Peñalver and Kaytal’s words, “[u]rban squatters were fixing 
broken windows, not breaking them.  It is perhaps for this reason that 
neighborhood residents were typically supportive of squatting efforts, 
notwithstanding their illegality.”220 
Even in utilitarian terms, formally illegal behavior with regard to 
property rights may be justified if the actor places a higher value on the 
property than the true owner, and is unable to transact because, for 
example, they have been evicted through foreclosure.221  As Peñalver and 
Katyal succinctly put it, “[o]n a cold night, at least as a purely subjective 
matter, the homeless man almost certainly values the sheltered entrance of 
a large shopping center more highly than even the most attentive owners 
value their right to exclude him.”222  
The same banks that are socially sanctioned for evicting blameless 
tenants are also socially sanctioned for boarding up foreclosed properties 
that they own.223  In fact, a number of local governments have recently 
                                                                                                                          
215 See Tristram Korten, Foreclosure Nation: Squatters or Pioneers?, MOTHER JONES (May–June 
2008), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/05/foreclosure-nation-squatters-or-pioneers (stating 
that the neighbors believe the current tenants, though they are squatters, are better than letting the 
vacant houses become crack dens). 
216 Kristin Kloberdanz, Foreclosed Homes: A Local Blight, TIME, Mar. 18, 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1723193,00.html. 
217 Leland, supra note 214, at A1. 
218 Korten, supra note 215. 
219 Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1125–27. 
220 Id. at 1152 (footnotes omitted). 
221 Id. at 1145. 
222 Id. at 1146. 
223 See Luke Mullins, The Run-Down Foreclosure Next Door: What You Can Do, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/real-estate/articles/ 
2008/10/23/the-run-down-foreclosure-next-door-what-you-can-do (advising neighbors to pressure 
banks to maintain foreclosed homes by calling them in close sequence and threatening to change 
banks). 
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proposed or enacted laws either prohibiting banks from neglecting 
foreclosed properties, or at least assessing them for the upkeep of the 
properties performed by local governments.224   
Interestingly, some state and federal court judges are resisting 
foreclosures not by resisting application of the formal law, but by insisting 
upon it to the letter.225  For example, Judge Arthur M. Shack of the New 
York State Supreme Court has made it a personal mission to throw sand on 
the tracks of the foreclosure process by insisting that each and every 
requirement of the formal law is satisfied.226  In the words of Judge Shack, 
“[i]f you are going to take away someone’s house, everything should be 
legal and correct.”227 
In summation, then, possession of foreclosed properties by blameless 
tenants is moving from illegal but socially acceptable to legal and socially 
acceptable.  Occupation of foreclosed homes by squatters may be moving 
from illegal and socially unacceptable to illegal but socially acceptable.  
And neglect of foreclosed homes by banks is moving from legal but 
socially unacceptable to illegal and socially unacceptable.  As predicted, 
these behaviors with regard to property move counter-clockwise around 
the PADs model, with changes in normative sensibility re-defining the 
scope and meaning of property rights. 
D.  Natural Resources 
There are two generally accepted, forceful utilitarian arguments that 
support the existence and protection of the right to exclude others from 
one’s property: the prevention of overuse on the one hand, and the creation 
of proper incentives for resource development as costs and benefits accrue 
to the owner of the resource, on the other.228  Of course, neither argument 
has force unless the object in question can be treated as property from 
which others may be excluded.  The Roman property law category of res 
communes refers to resources whose character makes them “incapable” of 
exclusively appropriating.229  Resources in this category are—in utilitarian 
thought—not treated as property because they cannot be, not because they 
                                                                                                                          
224 See Nicholas Casey, Banker: “What’d I Do Wrong, Officer?” Cop: “You’ve Got Algae in the 
Pool, Sir,” WALL ST. J., May 1, 2009, at A1 (“[B]ig cities like Cleveland and Buffalo had fashioned 
laws of their own to browbeat banks into taking care of urban blight.”); Carolyn Said, Empty Houses 
Spawn Trouble; Home Foreclosures, S.F. CHRON., May 3, 2009, at A1 (discussing ordinances in San 
Jose and Oakland forcing banks and lenders to maintain foreclosed properties).  
225 See Michael Powell, A “Little Judge” Who Rejects Foreclosures, Brooklyn Style, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2009, at A1 (discussing Justice Schack’s insistence that everything be “legal and correct” for a 
bank to foreclose on someone’s property). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the 
Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003). 
229 Id. at 93.  
 
2010] ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 493 
should not be.  As Carol Rose has noted, however, advances in both legal 
thought and scientific measurement have turned things once thought 
exempt from ownership into objects that can be appropriated.230  Things 
once thought to fall well within the category of res communes—such as the 
air—are now amenable to appropriation—for example, through the 
purchase or sale of a portion of it for use as a receptacle for pollution 
through cap-and-trade systems.  As the controversy surrounding cap-and-
trade systems demonstrates, now that such resources can be treated as 
property, we are forced to consider the question of whether they should 
be.231   
The allocation of rights in natural resources frequently displays 
divergences between legality and social acceptability.  Consider fishing 
rights.  In the absence of private rights, over-exploitation threatens the 
common fish stock, “a problem inherent in the uncontrolled exploitation of 
common property resources everywhere.”232  To prevent over-exploitation, 
some governments sell fishing rights as “a payment for the exploitation of 
common fishing grounds.”233  Formal property law, however, “works in the 
background of many different systems of rules presiding over the 
allocation of scarce resources,”234 including informal and deviant systems.   
In an insightful observational study of fishing communities in Norway 
and Newfoundland, Stig Gezelius noted this phenomenon.235  He found 
that compliance with fishing regulations depended upon notions of social 
acceptability.236  Some illegal behaviors were socially acceptable and some 
were not; some legal behaviors were socially acceptable and some were 
not.  The model below suggests how some behaviors are categorized. 
                                                                                                                          
230 Id. at 95. 
231 See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. §§ 204(b), 205(b) 
(2009) (treating energy as property that may be distributed); American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 726(c) (2009) (providing “emission allowances for sale”).  In many ways, 
the improvements in scientific measurement that make cap-and-trade systems in natural resources 
possible are the flipside of improvements in digital technology that make file-sharing possible.  In the 
case of natural resources such as air and fish, things which were once thought impossible to subject to 
private property rights can now be allocated to private owners.  In the case of file-sharing, however, 
works that once were considered easily protectable through private property rights can no longer be 
held exclusively.   
232 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Iceland on the Outskirts of Europe: The Common Property Resource 
Problem, 32 EUR. FREE TRADE ASS’N BULL., no. 2, 1991, at 23, 24 [hereinafter Gylfason, Iceland on 
the Outskirts].  
233 Thorvaludr Gylfason, The Pros and Cons of Fishing Fees: The Case of Iceland, 33 EUR. FREE 
TRADE ASS’N BULL., nos. 3–4, 1992, at 6 [hereinafter Gylfason, Fishing Fees].    
234 MATTEI, supra note 6, at 6. 
235 See Stig S. Gezelius, The Morality of Compliance in Coastal Fisheries: Cases from Norway 
and Newfoundland 3 (IASCP Northern Polar Regional Meeting, Conference Paper, 2003) 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/526 (describing how a moratorium on groundfish stocks 
“generated [a] social crisis in great parts of rural Newfoundland”). 
236 See id. at 4 (“Protecting the cod stock was regarded a collective responsibility, and a perceived 
moral obligation to take one’s share of the protection of a common good was strongly reflected in Little 
Spruce Harbour’s fishers’ morality of compliance.”). 
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       The Newfoundland village was almost entirely dependent upon fishing 
for its economic survival.237  Severe reductions in the cod stock in 
Canadian waters, however, led to drastic restrictions on fishing rights.238  
The restrictions resulted in real economic hardship for the people of the 
village, but were generally accepted as necessary to restore the stock for 
the future.239  Therefore, it was both legal and socially acceptable to fish 
within the limits set by the regulators. 
By contrast, some fishermen had developed reputations as cheaters, 
over-fishing and selling their excess catch on the black market.240  The 
cheaters were subject to both informal social sanctions—gossip, hard 
stares, injured reputations—and formal ones.  They were informed upon to 
authorities, who punished them.241 
More complex, and more interesting, were behaviors where the legality 
and social acceptability of behavior diverged.  For example, corporate 
trawlers—large commercial business operations based offshore, just 
beyond the reach of Canadian territorial waters—were engaged in legal 
activity.242  Nonetheless, they were scorned and generally despised by the 
village fishermen.  Despite a lack of hard evidence, they were blamed for 
                                                                                                                          
237 See id. at 2 (“Fishing and fish processing are the only significant industries in the community, 
and there are few employment opportunities besides these.”).  
238 Id. at 3. 
239 Id. at 3–4. 
240 Id. at 4. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 3–4. 
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overfishing the cod stock and causing the crisis regulations.243  Because the 
corporate trawlers were engaged in legal behavior, no formal enforcement 
response could occur.  In its place, the corporate trawlers were subject to 
informal, albeit ineffective, social sanctions—popular anger, disparaging 
rumors, and occasional threats.244  Elsewhere, however, Canadian fishers 
resorted to “popular justice” measures against perceived transgressors, 
including blockading ships from other nations.245 
On the other hand, in light of the restrictions, where before poaching 
had been both illegal and socially unacceptable, now the village residents 
found it socially acceptable, albeit still illegal, to catch cod for personal 
consumption.246  The villagers considered consumption morally justifiable, 
while selling cod was reprehensible.247  Interestingly, because catching cod 
for personal consumption was socially acceptable, little enforcement action 
was taken to prevent it by authorities, despite its illegality.248  Where 
legality and social acceptability diverged, legal institutions enforced 
property rights against behaviors that were outside the parameters of 
socially acceptable deviance, but not against behaviors that were illegal but 
within parameters of acceptable deviance. 
Iceland decided to protect fish stocks by allocating fishing permits and 
implementing catch quotas.249  When the law250 was implemented, only 
ships which had been fishing during the period between November 1980 
and October 1983 were eligible for an allocation of fishing rights.251  
Permits were issued to fishing vessel owners based on their average 
catches during that time.252  The permits are tradable.253  Later entrants to 
the market would have to buy their way in by purchasing or leasing rights 
from those who received the initial allocation.254 
                                                                                                                          
243 Id.  
244 Id.  
245 See Canadian Fishing Boats Block Ferry for 3rd Day, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 22, 1997, at 
A6 (“Angry Canadian fishermen maintained a hull-to-hull blockade of a U.S. ferry for a third day 
Monday in a dispute about salmon fishing quotas.”). 
246 See Gezelius, supra note 235, at 5 (“While Little Spruce Harbour residents requested more 
enforcement in terms of commercial poaching, they reacted with indignation and fury when household 
poachers were arrested and fined.”). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Gylfason, Iceland on the Outskirts, supra note 232, at 24.  
250 See Fisheries Management Act (Act No. 116/2006) (Ice.), available at http://www.fisheries.is/ 
management/fisheries-management/the-fisheries-management-act (“The objective of this Act is to 
promote [fishing banks’] conservation and efficient utilization . . . .”). 
251 Public Prosecutor v. Kristjánnson, No. 12/2000, at pt. V (Apr. 6. 2000) (Ice.)   Vessels that 
replace decommissioned ones that were active between November 1980 and October 1983 assume the 
rights originally allocated to the decommissioned vessels.  
252 See Gylfason, Iceland on the Outskirts, supra note 232, at 24 (“Based on catches in earlier 
years, 1981–83, fishing permits in Icelandic waters have been allocated to individual ships by the 
government . . . .”).  
253 See id. (“[T]he quotas can be traded domestically under close government supervision . . . .”).   
254 Id. at 25.  
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The Icelandic quota system has been successful in reducing the overall 
catch, thus conserving the common fish stock in Icelandic waters.255  But it 
has generated controversy among Icelanders, because the initial allocation 
of tradable fishing permits was made free of charge.256  As a result, 
potential new entrants into the industry find that they must buy the right to 
compete from their potential competitors,257 even though the Supreme 
Court of Iceland has declared that “stocks of ocean life are the common 
property of the Icelandic nation.”258  As economist Thorvaldur Gylfason 
posed the question, “does a government have an unqualified right to 
discriminate among citizens by giving a relatively small group of 
individuals free and marketable access to a valuable natural resource which 
is, by law, the common property of the nation?”259 
The Icelandic courts have upheld the system, but not without some 
obvious misgivings.  In the words of the Icelandic Supreme Court, “a 
significant part of the Icelandic nation was barred in advance from 
enjoying . . . a comparable share of the common property . . . as the 
comparatively few . . . who possessed ships active in fishing at the time 
limitations to fishing were originally imposed.”260  In fact, the court has 
strongly implied that its patience with the system is not indefinite:  
Although temporary measures of this kind [allocating 
rights without charge to some market participants, but forcing 
subsequent market participants to purchase rights from those 
who received rights for free] . . . to avert the collapse of fish 
stocks may have been justifiable . . . providing permanently 
by law for discrimination . . . cannot be regarded as logically 
necessary.261   
The perception that the system is unfair has led to open defiance.  In an 
extraordinary case before the Icelandic Supreme Court, one fishing 
company openly defied the rights allocation system after discovering that it 
could not afford to purchase fishing rights on the Icelandic Quota 
Exchange.262  In order to challenge the system in court, the defendants 
notified the Ministry of Fisheries that they would violate the law, and told 
                                                                                                                          
255 Id.  
256 See id. (“[T]hey do not like the idea of fishing firms being charged for rights that many of 
them have hitherto been granted for free.”). 
257 Id.  
258 Johanesson v. Iceland, No. 145/1998, at pt. III (Dec. 3, 1998) (Ice.) (translated from Icelandic).  
259 Gylfason, Iceland on the Outskirts, supra note 232, at 26.  
260 Public Prosecutor v. Kristjánnson, No.12/2000, at pt. V (Apr. 6, 2000) (Ice.) (translated from 
Icelandic).  
261 Johanesson, supra note 258, at pt. IV.  
262 See Kristjánnson, supra note 251, at pt. I (“After the voyage had been commenced it had come 
to light that the price for catch quotas . . . increased significantly.  They had then decided to continue 
fishing without a catch quota.”).   
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the authorities when and where their ship would be docking.263  They were 
charged with having caught approximately 34,000 kilograms of cod over 
the course of a week-long fishing trip, without rights to catch any.264  The 
head of the company admitted the charge, but argued that as an Icelandic 
citizen he was entitled to use the common fish stock on an equal basis with 
other citizens, without having to lease rights from other private citizens 
who had received them for free.265  He claimed he had been unable to 
afford to purchase rights from private parties on the Quota Exchange, and 
that to require him to do so would deny him right to choice of profession, 
and his right to equal treatment by the government, in violation of the 
Icelandic Constitution.266  The Icelandic Supreme Court agreed with the 
defendants that the system was unfair to them, but held that it did not rise 
to the level of a constitutional violation.267  
The case was subsequently brought before the United Nations’ Human 
Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.268  The United Nations Committee disagreed with the Icelandic 
Supreme Court, finding that the system did, in fact, violate the defendants’ 
constitutionally protected right to pursue employment freely and to be free 
from discrimination by the Icelandic government.269  The Icelandic 
government ignored the United Nations ruling, however, and continued to 
use the same rights allocation system.270  According to attorney Ludvik 
Kaaber who represented the defendants, defiance of the system is 
increasingly common and enforcement against violators is difficult and 
rare.271  
It is interesting to note that the Icelandic experience undermines the 
Coasean idea that in the absence of transaction costs, the initial allocation 
of property rights does not matter, because subsequent trade among private 
parties will produce an efficient outcome.272  Transaction costs, of course, 
                                                                                                                          
263 See id. (“The defendant Guðnason issued a declaration 10 February 1999, stating that ships 
owned by Hyrnό Ltd. would be sent to fish even if they had no catch quotas for the species of catch 
brought ashore.”).   
264 Id.   
265 Id.  
266 Id. at pt. I.  
267 Id. at pt. II.  
268 Haraldsson & Sveinsson v. Iceland, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
1306/2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1306/2004 (2007). 
269 Id. at 203. 
270 Interview with Ludvik Kaaber, attorney for Erlingur Sveinn Haraldsson and Örn Snævar 
Sveinsson (Feb. 1, 2010) (on file with author).  
271 Id. 
272 See Coase, supra note 97, at 15–16 (“Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are 
taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the 
increase in the value of production consequent upon the arrangement is greater than the costs which 
would be involved in bringing it about.”). 
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are inevitable in the allocation of property rights,273 but it is not transaction 
costs that have produced resistance to the Icelandic system.  The Icelandic 
experience suggests that an initial allocation that is perceived as unfair may 
result in a common view that the law itself produces behavior that is 
socially unacceptable, and that defying it is socially acceptable.  In that 
situation, as we have seen, people tend to be governed by norms of social 
acceptability rather than law.  In other words, the efficient outcome 
envisaged by the new property rights system is undermined because people 
act outside the law.  It is perhaps the initial allocation of rights itself that is 
the transaction cost that a fair and efficient market cannot overcome.  
Peñalver and Katyal find a similar example in the role of settlers of 
land in the American west.274  Settlers routinely engaged in formally illegal 
behavior in grabbing land to which they were not entitled.275  The position 
of the settlers and a large part of society was that those willing to work the 
land should own it, regardless of whether legal title was held by absentee 
land speculators in the eastern states.276  Their activity was more than 
socially acceptable, despite its formal deviance—it was seen in some 
quarters as heroic.277  Thus, though their behavior was formally deviant, 
the settlers “remained true to their normative community . . . .”278 
As Peñalver and Katyal make clear, eastern politicians reacted with 
outrage, calling the settlers “‘lawless rabble’” and insisting they be 
prosecuted for criminal trespass.279  To overcome formal law, settlers 
successfully appealed to juries to nullify verdicts against them, privileging 
socially acceptable deviance over formal law.280  In addition to defiant 
juries, state courts and legislatures expanded common law doctrines such 
as adverse possession to favor settlers.281  Eventually, the “settlers’ 
continued refusal to recognize the rights of absentee owners rendered the 
federal government’s pro-speculator stance untenable.”282  The federal 
government eventually went so far as to enact the Homestead Act, 
legalizing settlers’ once deviant seizure of federal lands.283 
                                                                                                                          
273 See Banner, supra note 55, at S365 (stating that there are “one-time administrative costs 
inherent in valuing and assigning rights”). 
274 Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1105–06. 
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276 Id. at 1107. 
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278 Id. at 1130. 
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V.  LAW’S ANCHORING FUNCTION 
Property, an inherently social institution, is influenced not just by law, 
but by norms of the social acceptability of behavior.  Where property law 
and norms of social acceptability converge, legal institutions function well.  
Where they diverge, legal institutions tend to falter, and social 
acceptability rather than law tends to control behavior.  Applying the 
acceptable deviance model to the normative evolutionary theory of 
property rights, we see that behaviors that are socially unacceptable but 
legal generate informal sanctions and, eventually, may become illegal.  
Behaviors that are socially acceptable but illegal tend not to generate 
sanctions, despite their formal illegality, and may eventually become legal.  
In this way, property rights evolve with changes in normative sensibilities, 
rotating counter-clockwise through the acceptable deviance model.   
As the PADs model predicts, eventually the law must change to reflect 
normative sensibilities.  And that is, in fact, what we see.  In the case of 
copyright, sharing music is moving across the normative boundary from 
illegal-and-socially-unacceptable to illegal-but-socially-acceptable.  As the 
controversy over the Thomas and Tenenbaum cases suggests, the next 
movement may be crossing the boundary from illegality to legality.  Rising 
unemployment and anti-immigration sentiment are pushing day labor 
markets first from the legal-and-socially-acceptable quadrant to the legal-
but-socially-unacceptable quadrant, and now in some jurisdictions into 
illegal-and-socially-unacceptable quadrant.  In response to the foreclosure 
crisis, we see squatting moving across the normative boundary from 
socially unacceptable to socially acceptable, and possession of foreclosed 
property by blameless tenants moving from illegality to legality.  Finally, 
in the case of fishing rights, behaviors such as poaching for consumption 
that were once both illegal and socially unacceptable became socially 
acceptable, pressuring the law to follow.   
Deviance from law, in favor of social acceptability, is not necessarily 
harmful.  In fact, it can protect important community values embedded 
within property law regimes, such as norms of sharing, utilizing natural 
resources to feed one’s family, interacting with one’s community in public 
spaces, and protecting blameless victims of the foreclosure crisis.  As 
Peñalver and Katyal say, “[p]roperty scholars should be attentive to the 
criminal enforcement of property laws and the ways in which that 
enforcement may unfairly punish or overdeter justified and useful 
lawbreaking by property outlaws.”284  In one sense, acceptable deviance is 
similar to Daniel Markovits’s concept of “democratic deficits.”285  
According to Markovits, illegal behavior is both justified and unavoidable 
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285 See Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L. J. 1897, 1902 (2005). 
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when there is a “democratic deficit”—when the law has not changed to 
reflect popular sentiment because of a flaw in the democratic process.286 
These divergences can also have serious negative effects to which legal 
institutions are ill-prepared to respond.  Behavior that is legal but socially 
unacceptable cannot generate a formal enforcement response from the 
state.  In the state’s absence, “popular justice” measures such as 
vigilantism may be taken by some in the community.  Thus day laborers in 
California may be confronted by violent neo-Nazis, and the religious 
fanatics from the Westboro Church are confronted by enraged mobs.287  On 
the other hand, behavior that is illegal but socially acceptable usually does 
not generate an enforcement response.  Unlawfully-motivated state actors, 
however, may enforce formal law and immunize themselves from the 
consequences of unlawful motivation because of the formal illegality of the 
behavior.  Thus, because of their race or ethnicity, some loiterers or day 
laborers might be arrested and not others; some blameless tenants may be 
evicted and not others. 
Recognizing the role of acceptable deviance both enriches our 
understanding of property rights and enhances our ability to detect the 
predictable malfunctions in legal institutions triggered by divergences 
between the legality of behavior with regard to property, and the social 
acceptability of that behavior.  It also allows us to recognize that although 
behavior with respect to property rights—and thus the evolution of 
property rights—may occur within parameters of normatively acceptable 
deviance around law rather than according to the law itself, the evolution 
of property rights is not chaos.  Behavior may not mirror law, but neither 
does it exist without reference to law.  Law seems to function as an anchor 
on behavior.  Anchors allow a limited amount of drift.  The anchor 
provided by law allows enough deviance to permit evolution in response to 
changes in normative sensibilities and economic incentives, while at the 
same time providing enough stability to support a functioning society.  
Perhaps in the end that is the beauty of the relationship between acceptable 
deviance and property rights—it provides both stability and the freedom to 
evolve.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Property rights evolve in response to changes in normative 
sensibilities.  Similarly, compliance with, and deviance from, law is often 
dependent upon the law’s convergence with, or divergence from, 
                                                                                                                          
286 See id. at 1928 (“The republican theory of democracy, and in particular its idea of a democratic 
deficit, has therefore created space for a characteristically democratic challenge to government 
authority that the liberal view cannot recognize.”).  
287 See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of day laborers in California and the Westboro Baptist 
Church congregation. 
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normative sensibilities.  Where the legality and social acceptability of 
behavior diverge, deviance is socially acceptable.  By applying a model of 
acceptable deviance to property rights, we can predict and actually observe 
the evolution of property rights in response to changes in normative 
sensibilities in areas as diverse as natural resources, copyright, 
foreclosures, and the use of public space.  We can also predict and observe 
stresses in legal institutions created by divergences in the legality and 
social acceptability of behavior with regard to property rights.  Law 
functions not as a straightjacket but rather as an anchor on behavior, 
providing stability, but also space for deviance which permits the evolution 
of property rights. 
 
 
